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Executive Summary 
 
The September 11th attacks impacted society generally, and law enforcement specifically, in dramatic 
ways.   One of the major trends has been changing expectations regarding criminal intelligence practices 
among state, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies, and the need to coordinate intelligence 
efforts and share information at all levels of government.  Despite clear evidence of significant changes, 
very little research exists that examines issues related to the intelligence practices of SLT law 
enforcement agencies.  Important questions on the nature of the issues that impact SLT intelligence 
practices remain.   
 
While there is some uncertainty among SLT law enforcement about current terrorism threats, there is 
certainty that these threats evolve in a largely unpredictable pattern.  As a result there is an ongoing need 
for consistent and effective information collection, analysis and sharing.   Little information is known 
about perceptions of how information is being shared between agencies and whether technologies have 
improved or hurt information sharing, and little is known about whether agencies think they are 
currently prepared for a terrorist attack, and the key factors distinguishing those that think they are 
compared to those who do not.  This study was designed to address these issues, and a better 
understanding of these issues could significantly enhance intelligence practices and enhance public 
safety.   
 
To develop a better understanding of perceptions about terrorist threats that SLT agencies face and their 
efforts to prevent terrorism, the research team distributed questionnaires via a web-designed survey to 
two separate groups of law enforcement personnel.  Development of the survey involved several 
preliminary drafts.  Feedback was sought from SLT intelligence workers about question content and 
coverage, and specifically whether questions were ambiguous or difficult to answer.  After making 
revisions, the final Institutional Review Board approved instrument had 48 structured, semi-structured, 
or open-ended questions.  The survey, despite its length, enabled respondents to share information about 
issues such as perceptions of terrorist threats, inter-agency interactions, information sharing, intelligence 
training, and agency preparedness.  Additional questions asked about characteristics of the respondent 
and the respondent’s agency.  There are three findings that are quite interesting.   
 
First, law enforcement perceptions about what is a serious threat in their community has changed 
significantly over time.  Law enforcement is much more concerned about sovereign citizens, Islamic 
extremists, and militia/patriot group members compared to the fringe groups of the far right, including 
Christian Identity believers, reconstructed traditionalists (i.e., Odinists), idiosyncratic sectarians (i.e., 
survivalists), and members of doomsday cults.   In fact, sovereign citizens were the top concern of law 
enforcement, but the concern about whether most groups were a serious terrorist threat actually 
declined for most groups (e.g., the KKK; Christian Identity; Neo-Nazis; Racist Skinheads; Extremist 
Environmentalists; Extreme Animal Rights Extremists).    
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Second, when examining whether the respondents thought that various agencies and sources were useful 
in their counterterrorism efforts, the agencies that appear to be most useful to SLT law enforcement 
include state/local fusion centers, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force(s), the FBI, and DHS Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis.  Overall, the internet and the use of open source materials, human intelligence 
sources, and the media were perceived as providing the most useful information.  Security clearances, 
adequate personnel, adequate training, adequate resources, adequate time, or the organizational culture 
were all perceived as barriers for the sharing of intelligence and information across agencies.   
 
Third, several factors impacted whether an agency was prepared for a terrorist attack. Agencies with 
satisfied working relationships with state organizations were twice as likely to be prepared, agencies that 
produce threat assessments and risk assessments more frequently are three-and-a-half times more likely 
to be prepared than agencies who create them less frequently, and the creation of vulnerability 
assessments also appears to be a predictor of preparedness as they more than quadruple an agency’s 
preparedness likelihood.  In addition, as agencies experience problems related to personnel, training, and 
resources, the likelihood they will consider themselves prepared is reduced by approximately three-fold.  
Agencies that felt they were not prepared highlighted problems with resources, training, and quality of 
working relationships with other organizations.  
 
Particularly for practitioners, the most important aspect of this research may not be the findings on the 
variable analyses, per se, but on the benchmarks identified in trends found in the data.  Some clear trends 
emerged which indicate programmatic successes for information sharing and intelligence, as well as 
areas where problems remain.  When considering these findings in the context of research on 
organizational development, it is clear that organizational leadership is an important factor for 
organizational successes in information sharing as well as for preparedness.  If the leadership of a law 
enforcement agency is willing to expend the effort to train personnel, develop partnerships, and 
participate in state, regional and national information sharing initiatives, then greater levels of success 
will be achieved.  While one would intuitively assume this, the data empirically supports it. 
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Introduction  
 
The September 11th attacks impacted society generally, and law enforcement specifically, in dramatic 
ways.   One of the major trends has been changing expectations regarding criminal intelligence practices 
among state, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies, and the need to coordinate intelligence 
efforts and share information at all levels of government.  The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States’ (2004) “9/11 Commission Report” highlighted that despite the United States’ 
sprawling law enforcement community, very few agencies other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) engaged in any type of counterterrorism efforts prior to the attacks.  The Commission Report also 
stressed that enhancing intelligence efforts and improving information sharing were critical to the 
prevention of terrorist acts.   
 
Law enforcement in the United States is decentralized, which poses incredible challenges in terms of 
effectively sharing information across jurisdictional boundaries, but such decentralization is also an 
opportunity.  An increasing number of SLT law enforcement agencies have expanded their information 
collection and intelligence analysis practices, and there have been fundamental changes in the national, 
state, and local information sharing infrastructure.  Despite clear evidence of these dramatic changes (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011; U.S. House of Representatives, 2013), law enforcement’s 
expanded role in counterterrorism, and the acknowledgement that local intelligence is critical to the 
prevention and deterrence of terrorist acts, very little research exists that examines issues related to the 
intelligence practices of SLT law enforcement agencies.   
 
The growth of intelligence practices in SLT agencies has coincided with an increasing acknowledgement 
within federal law enforcement, and in some instances the intelligence community, of the importance of 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement for enhancing the value of intelligence related to terrorism.   The 
importance of SLT’s contribution to the intelligence process can be highlighted in several ways.  First, 
although the FBI is the lead agency for the investigation of terrorism, the types of information provided 
by various sources and the sheer number of cases and leads requiring follow-up, highlights the 
importance of involving local law enforcement in terrorist investigations (Davis et al., 2004).  Second, it is 
critical to note that terrorism is a local event, and thus SLT law enforcement is in a unique position to 
contribute important intelligence because of their knowledge about individuals, groups, and 
organizations operating in local communities (Carter and Carter, 2009a; 2009b).   
 
In addition, the local nature of terrorism clearly highlights that SLT law enforcement agencies must have 
access to timely and actionable intelligence for the prevention and response to terrorist acts.  Third, 
critical infrastructures and high-value targets are dispersed widely in the United States, and many of 
these potential targets are located in rural and less-populated areas.  Local law enforcement agencies in 
these communities are in the best position to recognize when suspicious situations occur near these 
critical targets.  Fourth, survey research indicates that the terrorism experiences and expectations 
regarding intelligence work of state and local agencies increased after September 11th (Davis et al., 
2004).  Indeed, the FBI as acknowledged the importance of SLT law enforcement in counterterrorism 
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efforts through the presence of state and local law enforcement officers who are members of every FBI 
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). 
 
Important questions on the nature of the issues that impact SLT intelligence practices remain.  While 
there is some uncertainty among SLT law enforcement about current terrorism threats, there is certainty 
that these threats evolve in a largely unpredictable pattern.   As a result there is an ongoing need for 
consistent and effective information collection, analysis and sharing.   Second, little information is known 
about perceptions of how information is being shared between agencies and whether technologies have 
improved or hurt information sharing.  Finally, little is known about whether agencies think they are 
currently prepared for a terrorist attack, and the key factors distinguishing those that think they are 
compared to those who do not.  This study was designed to address these issues, and a better 
understanding of these issues could significantly enhance intelligence practices and enhance public 
safety.   
Data and Methodology 
 
To develop a better understanding of perceptions about terrorist threats that SLT agencies face and their 
efforts to prevent terrorism, the research team distributed questionnaires via a web-designed survey to 
two separate groups of law enforcement personnel.  The first group included individuals who had 
attended trainings through the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT).  A non-profit 
organization, MIPT was created after the Oklahoma City bombings to increase knowledge about 
terrorism prevention.  In line with this goal it offers traditional and online education programs to law 
enforcement officers, especially with respect to suspicious activity reporting; to date, 19,000 officers have 
undertaken these trainings.1 The research team therefore approached representatives of MIPT with a 
request to conduct survey research within this population and MIPT subsequently agreed to contact 
individuals who had registered for its training programs with an invitation to participate in the study. 
 
The second group consisted of individuals who had received training from the School of Criminal Justice 
at Michigan State University.  Funded by the Department of Homeland Security, the Law Enforcement 
Intelligence Toolbox program operated from 2005 until 2011 with over 4,500 officers from 2,100 
agencies enrolling during this time (Carter, 2013).  Many of these individuals had been selected by their 
department to learn how to develop an intelligence capacity.  This training provided the resources and 
information to familiarize participants with important issues surrounding intelligence practices.  In 
relation to the study, this sample is appropriate because it comprises personnel with an understanding of 
intelligence concepts and requirements, who are aware of organizational efforts to utilize knowledge 
about law enforcement intelligence. 
 
This research used a purposive sample, therefore there is selection bias; however, it was intended.  
Comparatively few law enforcement officers have worked with the intelligence process.  Even fewer have 
experience with the newest standards and guidelines.  Using a random sample of a broad population of 
                                                        
1https://www.mipt.org/ 
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law enforcement officers, generally, would provide no valuable results.  As a result, use of this sampling 
frame provided access to a population wherein the research team knew the respondents had been 
exposed to both law enforcement intelligence and the current standards and practices.   
Persons in both the MIPT and MSU samples had received training using the same national standards and 
programs.  Moreover, both training programs were funded by the Department of Homeland Security 
which had exacting standards for training course content and approval as well as a requirement that 
training programs had to be delivered in a manner that was consistent.  The value of these factors from a 
research perspective is that it strengthens internal validity of the measures and external validity to the 
population of law enforcement officers with contemporary experience in law enforcement intelligence. 
 
Development of the survey involved several preliminary drafts.  Feedback was sought from SLT 
intelligence workers about question content and coverage, and specifically whether questions were 
ambiguous or difficult to answer.  After making revisions, the final Institutional Review Board approved 
instrument had 48 structured, semi-structured, or open-ended questions.  The survey, despite its length, 
enabled respondents to share information about issues such as perceptions of terrorist threats, inter-
agency interactions, information sharing, intelligence training, and agency preparedness.  Additional 
questions asked about characteristics of the respondent and the respondent’s agency. 
 
Data collection involved the preparation of a web-based survey and then the transmission of emails to 
individuals in both samples.  In order to preserve the confidentiality of study participants, MIPT 
distributed emails to the first sample while the research team sent emails to the Toolbox sample.  
Collection began with an invitation email that outlined the purpose of the research and asked the 
addressee to complete a self-administered, online questionnaire.  It also included a URL that study 
participants could use to access the online survey.  As the study progressed, two sets of follow up emails 
at monthly intervals were sent. 
 
The number of responses by intelligence workers was 327 for the MIPT sample and 190 responses for 
the Toolbox sample.  However, as the study’s unit of analysis is at the agency level, we recorded counts 
for distinct organizations represented by individuals in both sampling frames.  Thus, the research team 
determined the MIPT sample consisted of 597 target and 179 responding agencies, while the Toolbox 
sample consisted of 302 target and 124 responding agencies.  The response rate was therefore 30.0 
percent for the MIPT sample and 40.6 percent for the Toolbox sample.  These response rates are 
promising given response rates to cross sectional surveys have declined (Brick and Williams, 2013) and 
that police personnel working in intelligence are highly sensitive to responding to questions regarding 
information sharing practices (Chermak et al., 2013).  Prior to analysis, submissions were removed 
where the law enforcement agency name could not be identified.   This left 364 responses from 
individuals who worked at 175 agencies, of which responses for seven agencies were included in both 
samples. 
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Demographics 
Table 1 shows categorical counts for the sworn status, role, and tenure of the study participants.  Most of 
the MIPT respondents indicated they were sworn officers (66.2%).  Many were investigators (39.7%) or 
analysts (32.4%), and very few held administrative positions (6.9%).  Approximately 18 percent of the 
respondents represented state agencies, 54 percent municipal agencies, and 28 percent represented 
county agencies. Roughly half of the respondents also reported serving for more than 15 years with their 
current agency.  Conversely, the vast majority of Toolbox respondents were also sworn officers (80%) 
and most had served for 15 years or more (58.5%).  However, most held roles as supervisors (31.3%), 
investigators (27.3%), or administrators (25.8%).  
 
Table 1: Sworn Status, Role and Tenure within their Agency 
 MIPT  Toolbox Training 
 n Percenta  n Percenta 
Sworn status      
   Sworn 151 66.2  108 80.0 
  Non-sworn 77 33.8  27 20.0 
Role      
   Administrator 15 6.9  33 25.8 
   Supervisor 47 21.5  40 31.3 
   Investigator 86 39.7  35 27.3 
   Analyst 71 32.4  20 15.6 
Tenure      
   Less than a year 3 1.3  0 0 
   1-3 years 16 7.0  2 1.5 
   4-9 years 57 25.0  20 14.8 
   10-15 years 52 22.8  34 25.2 
   More than 15 years 100 43.9  79 58.5 
a Percentages may not equal 100.0 due to rounding. 
Data Measures 
Efforts to combat terrorism among state and local law enforcement agencies have been a difficult area to 
empirically assess.  Concerns over security and the sensitivity of information coupled with high fidelity of 
such practices across agencies has hampered researchers’ ability to provide insights on such practices as 
compared to more traditional aspects of policing.  With this in mind, there is value in presenting both 
descriptive and inferential insights from the data gathered.  First, descriptive data is presented about 
state and local law enforcements’ perceptions of threats, information sharing relationships and 
networked systems.   Second, critical factors are identified that lead to the belief that an agency was 
either “Prepared” or “Not Prepared” for a terrorist attack.  
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Results 
Perceptions of Terrorist Threats 
In 2009, Freilich, Chermak, and Simone published results from a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
study that examined several issues, including law enforcement perceptions of terrorist threats in the 
United States.  Data were collected for this research in 2006-2007.  One of the goals of the current project 
was to again ask law enforcement officers about their concerns about several potential terrorist threats 
by type of group and type of incident.  The results from both studies are presented in Tables 2 and 3 for 
comparative purposes.  In Table 2, respondents were asked if they agreed that any of the seventeen 
extremist groups listed were a serious terrorist threat.  In this table, the mean scores are presented on a 
4-point scale (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree) and the (rank order) of officer concerns.   
There are several interesting findings.  First, there is wide variation about what groups are perceived to 
be a serious terrorist threat.  Law enforcement is much more concerned about sovereign citizens, Islamic 
extremists, and militia/patriot group members compared to the fringe groups of the far right, including 
Christian Identity believers, reconstructed traditionalists (i.e., Odinists), idiosyncratic sectarians (i.e., 
survivalists), and members of doomsday cults.   Second, the major concerns of law enforcement have 
changed considerably over time.  For example, when examining the 2006-07 survey results, law 
enforcement’s top concern was Islamic extremists.   
 
 
Table 2.  Perceived Threat of Extremist Groups by Type of Group 
Type of Group Potential Threat (2013-14) Potential Threat (2006-07) 
Sovereign Citizens 3.20 (1) 2.49 (7) 
Islamic Extremists/Jihadists 2.89 (2) 3.13 (1) 
Militia/Patriot 2.67 (3) 2.61 (6) 
Racist Skinheads 2.58 (4) 2.82 (3) 
Neo-Nazis 2.56 (5) 2.94 (2) 
Extreme Animal Rightists 2.54 (6) 2.79 (4) 
Extreme Environmentalists 2.51 (7) 2.74 (5) 
Klux Klux Klan 2.38 (8) 2.47 (8) 
Left-Wing Revolutionaries 2.36 (9) 2.04 (13) 
Extreme Anti-Abortion 2.36 (9) 2.30 (11) 
Black Nationalists 2.34 (11) 2.35 (10) 
Extreme Anti-Tax 2.33 (12) 2.47 (8) 
Extreme Anti-Immigration 2.33 (12) 2.41 (9) 
Christian Identity 2.19 (13) 2.59 (8) 
Idiosyncratic Sectarians 2.19 (13) 2.13 (12) 
Millennial/Doomsday Cults 2.17 (15) 1.93 (14) 
Reconstructed Traditions 2.13 (16) 2.04 (13) 
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The 2013-14 study results show that law enforcement’s top concern is sovereign citizens.  Although 
Islamic extremists remain a major concern for law enforcement, they are no longer their top concern.  
Approximately 39 percent of respondents agreed and 28 percent strongly agreed that Islamic extremists 
were a serious terrorist threat.  In comparison, 52 percent of respondents agreed and 34 percent strongly 
agreed that sovereign citizens were a serious terrorist threat.  This is interesting because sovereign 
citizens were ranked as the eighth highest group of concern among the 2006-07 sample.  Third, although 
estimates about some groups were a serious terrorist threat increased comparing the two time periods, 
(e.g., Left-Wing Revolutionaries; Extreme Anti-Abortion Extremists), the concern about whether most 
groups were a serious terrorist threat actually declined for most groups (e.g., the KKK; Christian Identity; 
Neo-Nazis; Racist Skinheads; Extremist Environmentalists; Extreme Animal Rights Extremists).   
 
The change is interesting as there was significant concern about the resurgence of the radical far right (as 
evidenced by the 2006-07 survey, as well as additional concerns raised after the 2008 election of 
President Barack Obama), but it appears as though law enforcement is, at present, less concerned about 
these groups.  Such changing perceptions about what is a serious terrorist threat is an important finding 
because identifying and prioritizing a threat is akin to hitting a moving target and evolves as new 
intelligence, data, and events develop.  Law enforcement must be steadfast in identifying major concerns, 
substantiating the concerns, providing products and resources to better understand the nature of the 
threat, and supporting efforts to respond to such concerns.  
 
Table 3 presents findings of the perceived likelihood of various types of terrorist incidents comparing the 
2006-07 and 2013-14 survey results.  In general, law enforcement perceptions on the likelihood of 
various types of terrorist incident are similar when comparing the two periods, although their top 
concerns changed.  In the 2006-07 survey, law enforcement officers rated an attack with conventional 
explosive devices and cyberterrorism as the two most likely events in that order.  Although the mean 
average for cyberterrorism was identical in the 2013-14 survey results, concern about the use of 
conventional explosive devices declined somewhat.  Similarly, the results from the 2013-14 survey show 
that law enforcement was somewhat less likely to think that most other types of incident were going to 
occur, compared to the 2006-07 results.  
 
Table 3.  Perceptions of Likelihood of Terrorism-Related Crimes by Type of Incident 
Type of Incident Likelihood of Incident  
(2013-14) 
Likelihood of Incident  
(2006-07) 
Cyberterrorism 3.09 (1) 3.09 (2) 
Conventional Explosive Devices 2.85 (2) 3.18 (1) 
Military Weapons Incident 2.60 (3) 2.50 (5) 
Biological 2.37 (4) 2.47 (7) 
Agroterrorism (food) 2.35 (5) 2.56 (3) 
Agroterrorism (disease) 2.26 (6) 2.56 (3) 
Chemical 2.25 (7) 2.50 (5) 
Radiological 2.13 (8) 2.13 (8) 
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Information Sharing Issues 
Table 4 presents the findings on whether the respondents thought that the agencies and sources listed 
were useful to them in their counterterrorism efforts.  Respondents were asked their opinions about both 
specific agencies as well as sources of information.   Mean values on a 4-item Likert scale are provided 
with 4 meaning that the information provided by a type of source or agency was very useful.  Overall, the 
law enforcement respondents thought that the agencies listed were useful or very useful sources of 
information on counterterrorism issues.  There was some variation of usefulness comparing across 
agency.   The agencies that appear to be most useful to SLT law enforcement include state/local fusion 
centers, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force(s), the FBI, and DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis.  The 
other sources asked about were considered to be somewhat less useful compared to agency information.  
Overall, the internet and the use of open source materials, human intelligence sources, and the media 
were perceived as providing the most useful information.   
 
Table 4.  Usefulness of Information from Agencies and Sources 
Agency Score Source Score 
State/Local Fusion Centers 3.53 Internet 3.40 
FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force 3.42 Media 3.14 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 3.34 Sources on the Street 3.12 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis 
3.27 Pro. LE Publications 3.06 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms  3.18 LEO 2.95 
Drug Enforcement Administration 3.15 Non-Law Enforcement 
Books  
2.78 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 3.13 RISS.net 2.76 
Law Enforcement Prosecutors 3.06 Alternative Literature 2.70 
State Office of Homeland Security 3.01 Risk Assessments 2.67 
Customs and Border Protection 2.69 HSIN.Intell 2.66 
State Attorney General Anti-terrorism Task Force 2.62   
 
The research team asked whether the respondent was satisfied with the relationship they had with 
various law enforcement and government agencies.  Table 5 presents these results on a 5-point scale 
with 5 meaning very satisfied.  The results show that respondents overall where very satisfied with the 
working relationship with most of the law enforcement, government, and even private sector agencies 
that were asked about.   In fact, the scores were over four for most agencies.  Some of the highest 
averages were for state and local law enforcement agencies, state/local fusion centers, and the 
Department of Homeland Security.    
 
Respondents were asked about several issues and whether they posed significant problems to the 
sharing of information.  These issues included security clearances, adequate personnel, adequate 
training, adequate resources, adequate time, or the organizational culture caused a problem to the 
sharing of intelligence and information across agencies.  A three item scale was used, with not a problem 
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(0), somewhat of a problem (1), and significant problem (2) as the response options.  The results indicate 
that most of these issues remain a significant challenge to effectively sharing information and 
intelligence.   The mean averages for the items were as follows:  security clearance (.82); adequate 
personnel (1.31); adequate training (1.19); adequate resources (1.22); adequate time (1.32); and 
organizational culture (1.17).   
 
Table 5.  Satisfied with the Working Relationship 
Agency Score Agency Score 
Local Law Enforcement 4.47 National Guard 4.12 
State/Local Fusion Center 4.45 State Office of Homeland Security 4.10 
State Law Enforcement 4.37 Homeland Security Investigation 4.10 
Department of Homeland Security 4.22 Hospitals 4.08 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 4.15 Public Transportation 4.03 
Emergency Management 4.18 Public Works 3.99 
Fire Marshals 4.18 Private Sector Agencies 3.97 
Department of Corrections 4.14 Public Health 3.93 
Critical Infrastructure Security 4.01 Internal Revenue Service 3.74 
Tribal Law Enforcement 3.99   
 
Finally, various information systems and networks were examined that are used to share intelligence and 
information and whether the respondents were satisfied with their use.  Table 6 presents these results.2  
In Column 2, the results report the percentage of respondents who do not use a respective system.  
Approximately one-third of the respondents have not used ATIX, FBINET, or LLIS.  Approximately 15 
                                                        
2 
A brief description of each system follows: 
ATIX – Automated Trusted Information Exchange.  A secure, but unclassified, information and messaging system, managed by RISS, 
to provide users with access to homeland security, disaster, and terrorist threat information. 
FBINET – The Federal Bureau of Investigation Network which is a global-wide area network used for communicating classified 
information at the Secret level, including investigative case files and intelligence pertaining to national security; it also runs 
administrative applications.  Most predominantly used by state and local law enforcement officers in fusion centers and HIDTA 
intelligence centers. 
LLIS – Lessons Learned Information Sharing, operated by the Department of Homeland Security, is accessible by law enforcement 
and emergency response personnel and contains a wide variety of information on best practices, after action reports, relevant alerts 
and news and a secure communications system.  LLIS includes an area specifically for law enforcement intelligence fusion centers. 
RISS – Regional Information Sharing System operates a secure intranet, known as RISS.NET, to facilitate law enforcement 
communications and information sharing nationwide.  RISS local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement member agency personnel 
have online access to share intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in many locations across 
jurisdictional lines. 
HSIN – Homeland Security Information Network is a secure internet-based system of integrated communication networks designed to 
facilitate information sharing between DHS and other Federal, state, county, local, tribal, private sector commercial, and other non-
governmental organizations involved in identifying and preventing terrorism as well as in undertaking incident management activities. 
LEO – Law Enforcement Online, operated by the FBI, is a secure, Internet-based information sharing system for agencies around the 
world that are involved in law enforcement, first response, criminal justice, anti-terrorism, and intelligence. With LEO, members can 
access or share sensitive but unclassified information anytime and anywhere. 
OSC – Open Source Center the focal point for the intelligence community's exploitation of open source material. It also aims to 
promote the acquisition, procurement, analysis, and dissemination of open source information, products and services throughout the 
U.S. Government. 
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percent of the respondents have never used RISS, HSIN, or the Open Source Center.  Only 9 percent of the 
respondents have never used LEO.  When a respondent stated that they used a particular network or 
system, they were generally very satisfied with it.  The response options were a four item Likert scale 
from “Not at All Satisfied (1)” to “Very Satisfied (4).”  The respondents were at least satisfied with all of 
the network and systems, but were generally more satisfied with LEO and the Open Source Center. 
 
Table 6.  Does Networked Systems Meet Information Sharing Needs? 
Networked System System Not Used Level of Satisfaction 
LEO 8.8% 3.33 
RISS 14.6% 3.28 
Open Source Center 14.8% 3.31 
HSIN 15.7% 3.23 
FBINET 28.3% 3.11 
ATIX 35.7% 3.04 
LLIS 32.4% 2.94 
 
Indicators of Preparedness 
Survey respondents were asked “In your opinion, how prepared is your organization for terrorist or 
criminal extremist threats in your region?”  Response options ranged from “not at all prepared” to “very 
prepared” along a five-point scale.  Two dichotomous dependent variables were created using the 
responses to this question.  Only agencies indicating they were “very prepared” were coded as being 
“Prepared,” and  only the agencies indicating they were “not at all prepared” were coded as “Not 
Prepared.”  The research team then explored what characteristics increased the likelihood that an agency 
was prepared or not prepared for the threats in their region.   
   
The analysis explored whether threats, relationships, or organizational factors affect these two 
dependent measures.  Threats are representative of serious and likely threats to the responding agency’s 
jurisdiction (see Table 1).  This threat variable was recoded into four categories.  Respondents were 
asked if a number of terrorist/extremist groups posed a serious threat to their jurisdiction with response 
options ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” along a four-point scale.  “Right-wing” is an 
additive index of an agency’s response to Militia, Sovereign Citizens,3  Klu Klux Klan, Christian Identity, 
Idiosyncratic Sectarians, Neo-Nazi, Reconstructed Traditions, and Racist Skinheads threats (α = .917; 
single factor eigenvalue = 5.156).  “Left-wing” is an additive index of an agency’s response to Left-Wing 
Revolutionary, Black Nationalist, Extreme Environmental, and Extreme Animal Rights threats (α = .910; 
single factor eigenvalue = 3.150).  Single-Issue is an additive index of an agency’s response to Extreme 
Anti-Tax, Extreme Anti-Abortion, Extreme Anti-Immigration, and Doomsday Cults threats (α = .913; 
                                                        
3 Although most organizations group Sovereign Citizens with other right wing groups, they are quite unique.  Sovereigns do 
not specifically share the “supremacist” views of the Klan, etc.  Their focus is not on individuals (e.g., minorities, Jews, etc.) 
rather their focus is on government dysfunction and abuse of authority.  Their anti-government ideology is arguably more akin 
to left wing anarchists than right wing Klansmen.   
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single factor eigenvalue = 3.717).  Jihad is an agency’s response to a single item of an Islamic 
Extremists/Jihad threat.   
 
Respondents were also asked if a number of types of attacks were likely to occur in their jurisdiction 
within the next five years.  Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive – CBRNE – is an 
additive index of an agency’s response to these four types of attacks (α = .856; single factor eigenvalue = 
2.839).   
 
Relationship variables are representative of the extent to which an agency has satisfied working 
relationships with organizations across sectors and levels of government.  While relationships between 
individual agencies are important, preparedness is likely reliant on relationships with a range of 
organizations across different levels and sectors.  Respondents were asked to indicate how satisfied they 
were with their working relationship with a variety of organizations.  Responses ranged from “we have 
no relationship” to “very satisfied” along a five-point scale.  Federal relationships is an additive index of 
an agency’s response to relationships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland 
Security, Homeland Security Investigations, Internal Revenue Service, and National Guard (α = .790; 
single factor eigenvalue = 2.768).  State relationships is an additive index of an agency’s response to 
relationships with State Law Enforcement, State Fusion Center, State Government Officials, Critical 
Infrastructure, Department of Corrections, Emergency Management, and State Office of Homeland 
Security (α = .869; single factor eigenvalue = 3.981).  Public relationships is an additive index of an 
agency’s response to relationships with Hospitals, Public Health Agencies, Public Works, and Public 
Transportation (α = .852; single factor eigenvalue = 2.791).  Private sector relationship is a single item of 
agency responses to their relationships with the private sector.  
 
Organizational factors represent a variety of agency characteristics likely to influence preparedness.  
Training is an additive scale representative of the total number of training programs attended by 
personnel from the responding agency.  These training programs included Fundamentals of Intelligence 
Training, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Analyst Course, Department of Homeland Security 
Critical Thinking as well as Report Writing, Drug Enforcement Administration Federal Law Enforcement 
Analyst Training, Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy as well as Center for Intelligence 
Training, National White-Collar Crime Center Intelligence Analyst Course, State and Local Anti-Terrorism 
Training, Bureau of Justice Assistance 28 CFR 23, and the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy (α = 
.778; single factor eigenvalue = 3.560).   
 
Threat assessments, threat warnings, vulnerability assessments, and risk assessments are analytic 
products created by the responding agency on a five-point frequency range of “never” to “daily.”  
Responding agencies were asked to indicate the extent to which a number of issues were serious 
problems in their agency, ranging from “not a problem at all” to “significant problem.”  These 
organizational problems included personnel, training, resources, and agency culture.  Responding 
agencies also indicated whether or not they had received external funding from federal, state, or local 
organizations in support of training, personnel, or equipment.  Lastly, responding agencies indicated the 
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number of total personnel employed by their organization as one of six total employee brackets.  The 
modal agency size response was 501 to 3,000 total personnel.  The table that presents the descriptive for 
these variables is provided as an appendix.   
Analytic Strategy 
 
Bivariate analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between agency preparedness and 
jurisdictional threats, relationships, and organizational factors.  Given the limited empirical work in this 
area, only bivariate logistic regressions were employed to test whether individual threats, relationships, 
and organizational factors predicted an agency’s perception of being prepared or not prepared.  Results 
of these bivariate relationships are presented in Table 7.  Descriptive information for the variables 
included is provided in the Appendix in Table A.  
 
The results are insightful and support intuitive suppositions.  With respect to factors predicting 
preparedness, agencies with satisfied working relationships with state organizations (O.R. = 2.67) were 
twice as likely to be prepared.  It appears that, at the bivariate level, as agencies produce threat 
assessments (O.R. = 3.59) and risk assessments (O.R. = 3.61) more frequently, they are three-and-a-half 
times more likely to be prepared than agencies who create them less frequently.  The creation of 
vulnerability assessments also appears to be a predictor of preparedness as they more than quadruple an 
agency’s preparedness likelihood (O.R. = 4.60).  Lastly, as agencies experience problems related to 
personnel (O.R. = -3.42), training (O.R. = -2.71), and resources (O.R. = -2.45) the likelihood they will 
consider themselves prepared is reduced by approximately three-fold.   
 
A number of factors appear to contribute to an agency being not prepared.  Clarification of the 
interpretation of these findings is needed.  First, when interpreting odds ratios for logistic regression, the 
percent above 1.0 indicates a more likely effect while the percent below 1.0 indicates a less-likely effect.  
If an odds ratio is negative, it simply means the predicting likelihood is increased in the negative, or 
opposite, direction.  Second, there is a difference between predicting an agency that is prepared and 
negatively predicting an agency that is not prepared.  While the presence of a certain factor may not 
statistically drive the prediction of being prepared, its presence may be strong enough to deter agencies 
from being not prepared.   
 
For example in Table 7, perceptions of the satisfaction of relationships with federal organizations do not 
predict an agency being prepared.  However, this same perception does predict that agencies are more 
than six times (O.R. = -6.48) as likely to be not prepared.  Thus it could be assumed that the perception of 
federal relationships among prepared agencies was not strong enough to indicate why they were 
prepared, while agencies that did perceive federal relationships as satisfactory were six-times as likely to 
indicate they were not well prepared. This is a dramatic difference in perception and also applies to state 
(O.R. = -5.84), public (O.R. = -.490), and private sector (O.R. = -5.10) relationships.  It appears that as 
agencies perceive to be working satisfactorily with organizations across levels of government and 
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sectors, they will not perceive the agency as not being prepared.  Such findings lend support to the 
importance of working relationships with external organizations. 
 
Table 7. Bivariate Relationships of Factors Influencing Agency Preparedness 
 Prepareda Not Preparedb 
Threats Coef Odds Ratio Coef Odds Ratio 
Right-Wing .092 1.39 -.097 -1.84 
Left-Wing .104 1.19 -.124 -1.87 
Single-Issue .131 1.31 -.125 -1.26 
Jihad .233 .76 -.272 -1.36 
CBRNE .246 1.91 -.156 -1.84 
     
Relationships     
Federal .223 1.84 -.262 -6.48*** 
State .236 2.67** -.234 -5.84*** 
Public  .203 1.67 -.227 -4.90*** 
Private .835 1.80 -.807 -5.10*** 
     
Organizational     
Training .043 .47 -.304 -3.85*** 
Threat Assessments .847 3.59*** -.829 *2.65** 
Threat Warnings .347 1.65 -.525 -4.01*** 
Vulnerability Assessments .964 4.60** -1.287 -2.75** 
Risk Assessments .678 3.61*** -1.501 -2.87** 
Personnel Problem -1.169 -3.42*** .414 2.25* 
Training Problem -1.122 -2.71** .733 4.03*** 
Resources Problem -.886 -2.45* .446 2.83** 
Agency Culture Problem -.394 -1.28 .706 3.81*** 
Received Federal Funding .834 1.33 .105 .21 
Received State Funding 1.231 1.36 -.088 -.15 
Received Local Funding -.094 -.09 -.014 -.02 
Agency Size .242 1.50 -.131 -.82 
a  The reference group for the “Prepared” dichotomous dependent variable is representative of an 
agency indicating their agency is “very prepared” to a preparedness question.  
b The reference group for the “Not Prepared” dichotomous dependent variable is representative of 
an agency indicating their agency is “not at all prepared” or “not prepared” to a preparedness 
question.  
***p>.001, **p>.01, *p>.05 
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Attendance at training programs also has a dramatic impact on the perception of being not prepared.  As 
attendance at training programs increases, the perception of being not prepared is reduced by almost 
four-times.  Moreover, analytic products also reduce the likelihood that an agency perceives to be not 
prepared.  As threat assessments, threat warnings, vulnerability assessments, and risk assessments are 
produced more frequently, there is approximately a three-fold reduction in an agency’s perception of 
being not prepared.   
 
Lastly, problems within the agency that inhibit information sharing appear to increase the perception of 
being not prepared.  Problems related to personnel (O.R. = 2.25) and resources (O.R. = 2.83) double the 
likelihood of an agency indicating they are not prepared.  Training problems (O.R. = 4.03) has a 
quadrupling effect on being not prepared while problems related to the agency’s culture (O.R. = 3.81) 
leads to a more than three-fold increase in being not prepared.   
Discussion 
 
Particularly for practitioners, the most important aspect of this research is not the findings on the 
variable analyses, per se, but on the benchmarks identified in trends found in the data.  Some clear trends 
emerged which indicate programmatic successes for information sharing and intelligence as well as 
indicators of areas where problems remain.  When considering these findings in the context of research 
on organizational development, it is clear that organizational leadership is an important factor for 
organizational successes in information sharing as well as for preparedness.  If the leadership of a law 
enforcement agency is willing to expend the effort to train personnel, develop partnerships, and 
participate in state, regional and national information sharing initiatives, then greater levels of success 
will be achieved.  While one would intuitively assume this, the data empirically supports it. 
The findings provide indicators of progress that has been made in the domestic intelligence enterprise as 
well as obstacles that remain to be overcome. The reader is cautioned to not exclusively judge one’s own 
agency based upon the findings of one or two variables in this study.  The findings collectively reflect a 
point in time on a continuum of development.  Rather than judge how one’s agency rates on a specific 
variable – for example, the nature of public-private partnerships in the jurisdiction – the reader should 
view all preparedness variables and make a judgment of progress and use the findings as a roadmap to 
increase preparedness and functionality of the intelligence process. 
 
A core responsibility of strategic intelligence is to identify changes in the threat picture, whether that is 
the emergence of new threats, changes in the methodology of current threats, or a diminished threat 
from some group or ideology.  The findings indicate that respondents believe that the changing nature of 
threats is of continued concern to law enforcement.  Respondents also indicated the nature of the 
changing threats have been effectively identified in the strategic intelligence process and shared with 
officers through bulletins and intelligence products.  Thus, it appears the intelligence process is 
producing actionable strategic results. 
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A key issue for law enforcement in the post-9/11 environment has been “information sharing” – there 
had long been a chorus that information sharing among state and local law enforcement was limited, but 
it was virtually non-existent with federal law enforcement.  In this study, SLT law enforcement 
respondents clearly indicate that the counterterrorism information sharing infrastructure and processes 
put in place post-9/11 (often referred to the Domestic Intelligence Enterprise) have been working to 
provide information among law enforcement agencies at all levels of government.  Anecdotally, the 
current concern is not about information sharing processes, but often about the quality of the 
information.  For example, an FBI or DHS intelligence product will be widely disseminated to state and 
local law enforcement, but it is often of the nature that officers should be “on alert” for certain types of 
threats, without more specific details.  Conversely, federal law enforcement often does not have any more 
detail about threats to provide.   
 
Respondents indicated they were highly satisfied with their relationships with other law enforcement 
agencies, government agencies and selected private sector partners in their counterterrorism activities.  
State and local law enforcement agencies, state/local fusion centers, and the Department of Homeland 
Security received the highest levels of satisfaction in mutual relationships. 
 
Despite these notable successes, there are still barriers to effective information sharing that need to be 
addressed in the eyes of SLT law enforcement.  The most prominent are:  security clearances for SLT 
personnel, adequate staffing of the intelligence function, the need for adequate pre-assignment training 
and in-service training, adequate resources to effectively perform the intelligence process and changing 
the organizational culture to utilize the intelligence process.  Interestingly, with the exception of security 
clearances, the major barriers as viewed by the respondents were factors within the law enforcement 
agencies.  Hence, these are barriers that can be more easily overcome than systemic barriers.  Perhaps 
the greatest challenge is changing the organizational culture, which is true for virtually any type of 
organizational change. 
 
A core investment by the federal government to increase information sharing has been developing or 
enhancing electronic information sharing systems and networks.  In the unclassified environment this 
includes, most notably, RISSnet,4 Law Enforcement Online (LEO)5 and the Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN).6  The findings indicate that many of the information sharing networks and systems 
appear to be somewhat underutilized.  Anecdotally, analysts and investigators, while having access to all 
of these systems, typically rely predominantly on one of the systems for simplicity, despite the fact that 
each system will have somewhat different information.7  However, those who use those networks and 
systems are highly satisfied with their operations and value. 
 
                                                        
4 http://www.riss.net  
5 http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/leo 
6 http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network  
7 A common complaint of users of these systems is the inconvenience of the logon processes as well as auto-logoff if the system 
has been idle.  Efforts of developing a Single Sign On have been unsuccessful. 
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The research team measured several factors on the general variable of “preparedness” to assess the kinds 
of knowledge, relationships, and tactical plans that were in place for attacks by various groups and 
methods.  Overall, respondents stated their agencies were generally well prepared, although there is 
always room for improvement.  It is probable that preparedness is also correlated with agency size and 
resources; however, this conclusion cannot be validated by the current data.  Nonetheless, it is clear that 
the information sharing structures and processes as well as other training and technical assistance 
provided to law enforcement agencies post-9/11 has increased both awareness and preparedness in 
response to threats by criminal extremists.  In particular, the findings show that those agencies which 
produce regular threat assessments and risk assessments are the most prepared.  A conclusion that might 
be drawn from this finding is that not only do the assessments identify threats and risks, but leaders of 
agencies that require such assessments are more attuned to preparedness. 
 
Respondents had attended a number of training programs related to intelligence and counterterrorism.  
Interestingly, as attendance at training programs increases, the perception of being not prepared is 
reduced by almost four-times.  While training is certainly a component of preparedness, there are many 
other policy and resource factors that contribute to overall agency preparedness.  However, consistently 
the respondents to this study viewed understanding the threat and responses to threats via training as an 
important component in overall agency preparedness. 
 
Similarly, respondents indicated that analytic products also support the perception that the agency is 
prepared for threats.  Ideally, this means threats were being recognized and tactical responses to threats 
being developed.  However, pragmatically one must also consider the fact that mere knowledge of threats 
contributed to the respondents’ perception of preparedness.  Interestingly, as threat assessments, threat 
warnings, vulnerability assessments, and risk assessments are produced more frequently, there is 
approximately a three-fold reduction in an agency’s perception of being not prepared.  This suggests that 
an agency which devotes time and expertise to analysis and information sharing with respect to its threat 
environment sees value in this type of intelligence and, consequently, would presumably act on that 
information to prevent or mitigate threats. 
 
The findings presented here are consistent with previous examinations of law enforcement’s progress in 
improving information sharing and intelligence practices at a more macro-level (see U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (2011) and the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security 
(2013)).  Collectively the findings show significant progress among law enforcement agencies for 
developing and sharing intelligence and information related threats by criminal extremists.  Not 
surprisingly, barriers still remain, yet the progress is significant in several fronts.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A. Descriptives 
Variable
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
Prepared 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Not Prepared 0.15 0.36 0 1 
     
Threats     
Right-Wing 19.76 4.91 8 32 
Left-Wing 9.74 2.84 4 16 
Single-Issue 11.27 3.18 5 20 
Jihad 2.89 0.90 1 4 
CBRNE 9.56 2.36 4 16 
     
Relationships     
Federal 17.79 4.89 5 25 
State 27.55 5.85 7 35 
Public  15.01 3.89 4 20 
Private 3.65 1.20 1 5 
     
Organizational     
Training 3.20 2.65 0 11 
Threat Assessments 2.52 1.23 1 5 
Threat Warnings 3.16 1.43 1 5 
Vulnerability Assessments 2.25 1.10 1 5 
Risk Assessments 2.33 1.14 1 5 
Personnel Problem 1.47 0.85 0 3 
Training Problem 1.36 0.86 0 3 
Resources Problem 1.39 0.87 0 3 
Agency Culture Problem 1.36 0.91 0 3 
Received Federal Funding 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Received State Funding 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Received Local Funding 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Note: Modal agency category is 501-3000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
